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LIBERALISM AND LEGAL SCIENCE: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN
I. Introduction
Liberalism today is engulfed by a "semantic bedlam"' and besieged on both
the left and right. Eric F. Goldman found that self-avowed liberals disagree
among themselves as to what the term means.2 For some the appellation connotes
a willingness for peaceful change, a progressive outlook shared by reform-minded
persons. Originally conceived as a rationale of individual freedom, and later
embodied by romantic nationalist aspirations, some contemporary liberals mili-
tate against the very institutions which their predecessors thought necessary for
the preservation of individual freedom and the state.'
Certainly, no set of associated ideas remains static in the face of history.
Liberalism in America underwent a radical shift in orientation during the latter
half of the nineteenth century. By the third decade of the twentieth century,
new ideas had taken firm root. Much of the current confusion concerning liber-
alism results from social change which occurred during those years. If a par-
ticular kernel of the older or classic liberal doctrine remains alive today, altered
manifestations of these key principles are, therefore, understandable. Even the
most vociferous critics of liberalism (whatever their political persuasion) can
hardly deny its continuing influence on American thought. However, due to
intellectual confusion with regard to the meaning of liberalism, the nature of
that influence is unclear.
Morris Raphael Cohen attempted to identify the central truths of liberalism.
In doing so, he sought to mediate between the old and the new liberalism. His
jurisprudence consists of a legal science grounded on liberal principles. Cohen
meant to reconcile polar opposites-the metaphysical and the positivistic views
of law-as they were reflected at different stages in American liberal juris-
prudence.'
This note reviews the bifurcated growth of liberalism in America and, on
this basis, argues for the need of legal science as envisioned by Cohen. The time-
liness of this argument is reflected in recent attempts to formulate new liberal
oriented ideologies or to resurrect classic liberalism. As seen below, the works
of Theodore Lowi, John Rawls, and 6thers typify these efforts. Particular criti-
cisms of the newer form of liberalism are considered, and it is shown how a con-
structive interpretation of Cohen's legal science constitutes a framework within
which a usable liberal jurisprudence can be developed.'
1 Goldman, Foreword to E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WIT DESTINY at v (rev. abr. ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as GOLDMAN].
2 Id.
3 Thus although liberals are often identified with a "big government" ideology, they
are also associated with the supra-nationalistic objective of international or world union.
Meanwhile, critics on the political left malign liberalism as the mainstay of middle-class
dominance over the poorer laboring classes. And conservatives who adhere to the classic
liberal doctrine of laissez faire economics attack big spending liberal governments which must,
necessarily, tax big as well.
4 D. HOLLINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL 171 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as HOLLINGER].
5 Reid, Morris Cohen's Case for Liberalism, 33 THE REV. OF POL. 489 (1971).
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II. Classic Liberalism
A. Natural Rights Philosophy
American legal thought developed amid other intellectual pursuits. Its
connection with philosophy is especially strong. Until the advent of the secular
university, the major contributors to American philosophy were clergymen and
lawyers. Jefferson and the other founding fathers thus viewed themselves not
only as political engineers but also as universal philosophers, products of the
Enlightenment, an Age of Reason.' The original documents of American in-
dependence and statehood espouse their natural rights philosophy 7 which, until
the latter half of the nineteenth century, comprise the major tenets of American
liberal jurisprudence.
Classic liberal doctrine defends the natural rights of the individual and
the invisible harmony of society. Justice is considered a form of nature and
manmade law must conform to natural law if the former is also to be just.
Translation of the absolute moral qualities of justice into positive law is accom-
plished by logical deduction. Individual human reason thus reaches beyond
the corporeal world to the unseen realm of moral values. Accordingly, political
institutions must give full rein to the individual to bargain his own contracts,
to hold and dispose of his own property, and to run his own government. Classic
liberals thus consider republican government to be the most just political arrange-
ment. Furthermore, equality before the law is classic liberalism's judicial aspect:
both the plaintiff and defendant compete as equals to show the better reason for
their side; that they are social unequals is irrelevant. The function of the judge
is to coordinate individual rights and administer remedies when due. This is the
sporting theory of justice used at common law. Classic liberalism also means
laissez faire economic policy: the government should leave the individual alone
while society's natural harmony or "invisible hand" automatically regulates
supply and demand.
B. English and Scottish Origins of Classic Liberalism
The faith which Jefferson and others placed in the inherent reasoning
ability and moral inclinations of man stem from a long history of ideas. Notions
of natural rights and harmonies date back at least to the ancient Hebrews and
Greeks. The ideas received renewed emphasis in the Middle Ages, when Saint
Thomas Aquinas sketched what he thought was the tripartite structure of God's
laws.' However, none of these beliefs directly influenced the founding fathers,
for they were guided by more recent philosophers, especially John Locke9 and
the Scottish realists.1"
6 A. KOCH, POWER, MORALS, AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS IN THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE AMiERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, 1-2 (1961).
7 C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE-A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 26-27 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BECKER]; M. COHEN, The Bill of Rights
Theory, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 148-49 (1933).
8 D. LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 70-81 '(1964) [hereinafter cited as LLOYD].
9 BECKER, supra note 7, at 27.
10 Address by Murray Murphey, University of Notre Dame (Feb. 21, 1977) [hereinafter




John Locke wrote with revolution in mind. His second treatise, a "kind of
political gospel"" in colonial America, aimed to refute the theory of a divine
right of kings. Prior to the Reformation, monarchs justified their authority on
the basis of a compact with the deity. Under this compact the ruler committed
himself to deal righteously with his subjects. If he failed to do so, the subject
could be absolved from allegiance through Papal intervention. But with the
decline of Papal authority in the sixteenth century, monarchs began to claim
unlimited grants of power from God. During the seventeenth century, therefore,
people sought a rationale to repudiate this divine right of kings and to justify
revolution."
Locke's solution postulated a hypothetical state of nature. He wondered
what man is like in a pre-governmental, pre-legal environment. In such a state
what are the laws of nature to which all men must conform? His answer typifies
the classic liberal position:
The state of nature has a law to govern it, which obliges everyone: and
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions....
In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by
another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure
God has set to the actions of men .... 3
Furthermore, because reason is the distinctive divine spark of humanity, Locke
concluded that individual reason is the only legitimate or moral basis of govern-
ment; good government is consequently republican government because only in
a republic does individual reason rule. Such a government only follows from a
social contract into which rational men freely enter:
Men being, as has been said, all free, equal, and independent, no one can
be put out of his estate, and subjected to the political power of another,
without his consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his
liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men
to join and unite into a community .... 14
2. Scottish Realism
Though Locke's influence oh the founding fathers is widely reported, the
school of Scottish Realism held the most extensive and long-lasting sway over
tion of Its Influence (July 17, 1963) (unpublished thesis submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy).
11 BECKER, supra note 7, at 27.
12 Id. at 28.
13 J. LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
6 (1937).
14 Id. at 63.
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the intellectual life of the young country. Until the latter half of the nineteenth
century, popular notions of human nature hinged on the Realist concept of
moral sensibility. Just as one sees with his eyes so one perceives the moral order
of nature with his reason. By analogy, the criminal is one whose moral senses
are at least temporarily blinded. The object of law is to teach him to see again.
A scientifically respected penological philosophy of rehabilitation thus came into
widespread use as a result of the concept of moral sensibility.15
Yet the doctrines of the Scottish realists were also put to less broadly human-
itarian ends. Moral sensibility, unlike Locke's assumed state of nature and
nature's laws, is not intrinsically supportive of popular sovereignty. Some people
become permanently blind if the surrounding environment is inhospitable to
positive moral behavior. Such moral degeneration is genetically transferable.
While Jefferson, for example, trusted all normal men, i.e. those whose moral
sensibilities have not been permanently impaired, he feared those people whose
past precludes their cure.1" This fear of a morally corrupt racial or ethnic group
helps to explain Jefferson's ambivalence on the question of slavery. Given a
state with a vanishing frontier and increasing scarcity of unclaimed land, this
concept becomes a defense for the established propertied class, providing a ratio-
nale for holding the impoverished immigrant in a subordinate position.
III. Transition: Decline of Classic Liberalism and Rise of New Liberalism
Such a condition existed in the United States in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Waves of east European immigrants entered the hith-
erto Anglo-Saxon country seeking liberty and prosperity. Instead, they found
themselves cooped up in decrepit urban slums. Industrialization produced sweat
shops and factories. Employers could not treat their numerous employees with
the sort of individualized attention intrinsic to the classic liberal ideology. The
mass society was born; to get humane working conditions and decent wages,
old tactics and ideas had to be discarded.'
7
The metaphysics of moral sensibility and abstract natural order underwent
a rapid decline. Scientific refutation of Realist penology and the inability of
metaphysicians to clearly articulate the source or functions of the abstract moral
law contributed to this decline. In addition, the discoveries of Charles Darwin
and the social applications of those discoveries by Herbert Spencer turned men's
heads away from metaphysics. Social Darwinism offered the vision of historical
evolutionary social development. The propertied class found a new ideology:
if those who survive are the fittest, then surely it is the wealthy man who has
proven himself the most fit member of society. Despite its rejection by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the famous Lochner case,'8 this ideology con-
15 Murphey, supra note 10.
16 Id.
17 GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 65.
18 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court
declared a New York maximum ten hour working day statute to be an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with the liberty of the individual to contract. 198 U.S. at 46. Holmes' dissent argued
against the classic liberal laissez faire doctrines at the root of the majority opinion. "This
case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain."
198 U.S. at 75. Legislatures, Holmes stated, should not be pre-empted by the courts simply
because the economic convictions of judges would have produced a different result. Freedom
[April 1977]
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tinued to flourish. But Social Darwinism also instigated a new school of liberal
thought which dealt with the complexities of mass industrial society. 9
IV. New Liberalism
New liberalism formed around a sociological perspective of strife between
individuals and among groups. This scenario accorded with the Darwinian pic-
ture of constant struggle for survival. The new liberals recognized that individ-
uals could not always be entrusted with their own welfare. Man's fight against
man is too intense. Industrialized society, furthermore, is not self-regulating
because ownership of the means of production provides the propertied class with
historically unparalleled power over other individuals.
A new school of liberalism developed in response. Whereas classic liberal
jurisprudence had advocated the sanctity of contract and property, and the
equality of all individuals, the new liberalism subordinated all of these factors to
the public interest.2" In addition, laissez faire principles yielded in the face of
economic crises. The failure of private humanitarian aid and state general assis-
tance programs pointed to a need to solve the problems of mass unemployment
through comprehensive social welfare legislation.2 Additionally, government
fiscal policy, it was expected, could smooth the business cycle and prevent future
financial calamities.
Jurisprudential and philosophic thinkers, influenced by the socio-cultural
picture drawn by Spencer and the realities of industrial life, banded together in
a "revolt against formalism."22 Formalism, an outlook more than a perspective,
betokens an exaltation of form over substance, ideal over material reality. Locke's
concept of natural rights and Realist moral sensibilities both partook of a for-
malist orientation. That is, they appealed to an ideal world of natural morality
to provide a guide for human behavior. John Dewey, in philosophy, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., in jurisprudence, led the way to a non-metaphysical, almost
strictly empirical, analysis of social functions.
A. John Dewey
Dewey's instrumental philosophy "holds that ideas are plans of action, and
not mirrors of reality . . . and that philosophy ought to free itself from meta-
of contract meant in this context a victory of the rich man's interpretation of Social Darwin-
ism. Holmes rejected this point of view: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or
of laissez faire." 198 U.S. at 75.
19 GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 73. Goldman distinguishes these tendencies by the terms,
"Conservative Darwinism" and "Reform Darwinism." Id.
20 R. POUND, ADMINISTRArVE LAW 11 (1942). Pound explains the difference "between
'the coordinating law,' which secures interests by reparation and the like, treating all in-
dividuals as equal, and the 'subordinating law,' which prefers some, or the interests of some,
to others according to its measure of values." Id. This distinction was originally made to
explain the sudden expansion of subordinating, i.e. public, law in the twentieth century. At
common law, public law was reduced to a branch of private law. Today this position is
reversed. Public law seems to be eating up private law and practitioners can no longer depend
solely on common law remedies. I.d. at 12.
21 R. LEVY, T. LEwis, & P. MARTIN, SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL-CASES AND
MATERIALS 51, 54 (1971).




physics and devote itself to social engineering."23 Innate reason or human in-
stinct, Dewey found from his study of psychology, is unable to explain human
conduct and attitudes. Recourse must be had to custom and habit. The idea of
mind or inborn reason separated from the "cultural matrix," 4 an idea which
Locke and other classic liberals supported, thus found its repudiation in Dewey's
"new psychology."25 Man's moral character is the product of historical forces
and, Dewey asserted,
there is moral progress as well as moral order. This may be discovered
by an analysis of the very nature of moral conduct, but it stands out more
clearly and impressively if we trace the actual development in history.26
This "new" psychology is thus a historical social psychology; it looks to the
moral evolution of human values. By discovering the course of man's ethical
progression, we gain "guidance for the unsolved problems of life....
From his new psychology, Dewey, therefore, adduced a method of social
control:
The need of the hour seems . . .to be the application of methods of more
deliberate analysis and experiment. The extreme conservative may depre-
cate any scrutiny of the present order; the ardent radical may be impatient
of the critical and seemingly tardy processes of the investigator; but those
who have considered well the conquest which man is making of the world
of nature cannot forbear the conviction that the crude method of prejudice
and partisan controversy need no longer dominate the regulation of life
and society. They hope for a larger application of the scientific method to
the problems of human welfare and progress.
28
B. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
The thread linking Dewey and Holmes is a common emphasis on the socio-
cultural aspects of human thought. But Holmes, unlike Dewey, did not con-
sistently contribute to the effort toward moral progress through social experi-
mentation. Ethics and logic, Holmes felt, are matters of conscience and subjec-
tive judgment. While he believed that the historical studies of ethical change
which Dewey advocated are theoretically interesting, they contribute little to
any truly "practical science" of society. Holmes, nevertheless, made valuable
contributions to both the theoretical and practical sciences in the field of law.29
1. The Theoretical Science of Law
Study of legal history convinced Holmes that law is largely judge-made.
23 Id. at 7.
24 Id. at 19.
25 Id.
26 J. DEWEY & J. TUFTS, ETHICS 4 (1908) [hereinafter cited as DEWEY & TUFTS].
27 Id. at 4-5.
28 Dewey & Tufts, Foreword to DEWEY & TUFTS, supra note 26, at v.
29 See 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) [hereinafter cited as THE COMMON
LAW]; 0. W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS]; THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES (M. Lerner ed. 1943).
[April 1977]
[Vol. 62:653]
Ethical values characteristic of a judge's social background are invariably in-
jected into manmade (or positive) law. A theoretical legal science, while of
little use to the practitioner, could sort out the intricate historical development
of such ideas and "burst inflated explanations."30 Holmes found, for example,
that the needs which conjure up certain legal theories are often met, or simply
disappear, while the ideas themselves persist in subsequent legal reasoning. The
original purpose of such theories is forgotten, and tortured rationalizations of
them evoke illogic and fictions from the bench or bar." Note, for example, that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity persists even though actions against govern-
ment officials easily overcome the outdated and forgotten rationale which orig-
inally prompted its development. 2 The unwillingness of judges and political
theorists to face up to the social impact and illogic of their reasoning is the sort
of conservative formalism which Holmes most bitterly denounced.3
1. The Practical Science of Law
While Holmes' early work dealt with theoretical legal science, his later writ-
ings focused on the usefulness of practical legal science. Realizing that a single
word contains more than one meaning, Holmes deliberately chose a practitioner's
definition of law: "the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by law. '3' The practical lawyer's job is to
predict what a judge will decide. Just as scientists seek rules on the basis of which
they can make valid predictions, so lawyers do the same. As practical scientist,
however, the lawyer should not be swayed by personal ethics or value-laden
deductions. By avoiding such moral and logical commitments, he can observe
what is really going on within society and the courtroom.3
C. Sociological Jurisprudence
Holmes did not always clearly distinguish theoretical from practical legal
science. His ambiguity allowed two different interpretations: the sociological
and the realistic.3 ' Roscoe Pound led the sociological effort; borrowing heavily
from the work of Dewey, Pound treated moral values as facts within a socio-
historical continuum. While Locke, the classic liberal, talked about rights,
Pound spoke of claims or social interests. Pound's jurisprudence is, in fact, a
five-step effort aimed at determining the scope and subject matter of a legal
system. The five steps include:
30 O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS,
at 225.
31 THE CozmoN LAw, supra note 29, at 5. Liberalism itself, as illustrated in this note,
was created for one purpose; but under changed circumstances it was refitted for other ends.
Only a certain family resemblance between the objectives of old and new liberalism, i.e. a
humanistic aspiration for individual welfare and social betterment, links the two together.
32 See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 209 '(1963).
33 O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 29, at
187. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Id.
34 Id. at 173.
35 Id. at 179.
36 O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 30, at 224-25.
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1. a survey or inventory of social interests;
2. determining those interests which the law should secure;
3. determining the principles upon which such chosen interests should be
defined and limited;
4. determining the means by which the law can secure them; and
5. taking account of the limitations on effective legal action. 7
With his table of social interests, Pound hoped to build a system of legal norms
to guide judicial and legislative action. He "intended to end the chaotic and
episodic character of discussions of public policies by listing all of the main head-
ings or classes of policies recognized in mature systems of law."38
D. Legal Realism
The legal realists, on the other hand, repudiated the overtly prescriptive
character of Pound's generalized legal norms. Led by men like Karl Llewellyn,
the realists thought that a value-free, objective analysis of the legal order cor-
responding to Holmes' practical science of law must precede any attempt to
direct law toward particular social ends. Without a full knowledge of the law,
generalized legal norms could not be implemented. Llewellyn identified nine
"common points of departure"39 characterizing the realist position:
1. The conception of law in flux, of moving law, and of judicial creation
of the law.
2. The conception of law as a means to social ends and not as an end in
itself; so that any part needs constantly to be examined for its purpose,
and for its effect, and to be judged in the light of both and of their rela-
tion to each other.
3. The conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than the
law, so that the probability is always given that any portion of law needs
reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve.
4. The temporary divorce of Is and Ought for purposes of study.... The
argument is simply that no judgment of what Ought to be done in the
future with respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without
knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now
doing. ....
5. Distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they purport
to describe what either courts or people are actually doing. Hence the
constant emphasis on rules as 'generalized predictions of what courts
will do'. ...
6. Hand in hand with this distrust of traditional rules (on the descriptive
side) goes a distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formu-
lations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions....
37 E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 518-19 (1953).
38 Id. at 523/




7. The belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal situations
into narrower categories than has been the practice in the past .... This
is connected with the distrust of verbally simple rules....
8. An insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects,
and an insistence on the worthwhileness of trying to find these effects.
9. Insistence on sustained and programmatic attack on the problems of law
along any of these lines . . . to pick up such ideas and set about con-
sistently, persistently, insistently to carry them through.4"
E. New Liberal Jurisprudence
The divergent approaches of the sociological and realist schools merge in
their typically classic liberal concern for the maintenance of individual welfare
and social improvement through law. Pound's subordination of positive law to
organized social interests helped to create an intellectual climate conducive to
the implementation of new public policies. The great surge of administrative
law which followed was an effort by liberal legislators and jurisprudes to indi-
vidualize justice in mass society, an ideal shared by both old and new liberals.4
Similarly, a flood of social legislation was enacted which was concerned with
individual welfare, subordinating such concern only to the public policy behind
the particular statutory enactment."
Even in the traditional areas of private law such as torts, property, and
contracts, sociological jurisprudence inched its way.43 Many court decisions
weighed the equities against a legislatively mandated or judicially recognized
public policy.
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the flood of civil rights legislation and
decisions since 1954.44 Liberals, still entranced by the Darwinian picture, no
longer sought the classic liberal ideal of absolute equality. Instead, they set their
sights on equal opportunity. This change is a measure of the diminished signifi-
cance of the individual in mass society and the realization that all one can expect
from life is an equal chance, not complete parity. It also represents a heightened
awareness among new liberals of the society about them and, most importantly,
a readjustment of old liberal ideals to new realities.
At the same time, legal realists carried forth the sort of analyses which
Llewellyn demanded. They came up with significant results: model legislation
incorporating social realities, and thereby giving positive law greater certainty
for the average individual and easier predictability for the practicing attorney.
The Uniform Commercial Code is representative. Written principally by
Llewellyn, the Code integrates customary courses of dealing45 and usages of
40 Id. at 1236-38.
41 K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIIINAhY INQUIRY 19 (1969).
42 R. POUND, supra note 20 at, 27-28 (1942).
43 Notable is the extension of strict liability in tort into areas traditionally reserved to
contract and property. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 634-40 (4th ed.
1971). "The notion of 'public policy' involved in private cases is not by any means new to
tort law ... but it is only in recent decades that it has played a predominant part." Id. at 15.
44 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 '(1954).
45 U.C.C. § 1-205.
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trade46 with the law. Never before had American statutory law so deeply com-
mitted itself to the regularized routine of everyday mercantile practices while
at the same time leaving traditional principles of equity untouched." New
liberalism thus impressed its ideas on the law without abandoning its traditional
values of individual welfare and social improvement. The Code's great success
brought other uniform legislation in its wake.4"
V. The Decline of New Liberalism
A. Legal Positivism
Despite the obvious achievements of new liberalism, criticism of it mounted
in successive waves throughout the twentieth century. First, legal positivists
denied the scientific validity or meaningfulness of ethical values. Imported from
both England and the European Continent, legal positivism rested its notion of
science on the existence of things which are empirically verifiable. Sense data
is the sole criterion of what exists.
A true legal science, the positivists asserted, is based on observation, descrip-
tion, and generalization. A "Law of Nature is merely an observed persistence of
pattern in the observed succession of natural things: Law is then merely Descrip-
tion.""
Values, by this measure, do not exist, and because values do not exist, talking
about values is non-scientific. Indeed, such discussion is reduced by the positivists
to mysticism. Consequently, the liberal ideology came under fire for having in-
jected ethics into legal cum social science."0
Observation of human phenomena led the positivists to conclude that the
essence of manmade law is coercion. Might literally is legal right. The juris-
prudential task is to trace the ways in which coercion is exerted (primarily by
the sovereign state), and to induce from these observations the most statistically
probable laws of causality.
Whereas classic liberals deduced applications of natural law from immuta-
ble moral principles, the positivists denied the existence of non-sensory morality.
For the positivist, therefore, the only scientific method is induction, not deduc-
tion.5 1 In this way, new liberalism shared an empirical orientation with posi-
tivism while, at the same time, retaining the ethical drives of classic liberalism.
However, because of the popularity of the positivist critique among philosophers
and jurisprudes, new liberalism lost a great deal of its intellectual support.
B. Alternatives to New Liberalism
Beyond the pale of academic debate, new liberalism subsequently suffered
46 U.C.C. § 1-205.
47 U.C.C. § 1-103.
48 E.g., the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, the UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAC-
TICES ACT, and the UNIFORm FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT.
49 A. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 41 (1933).
50 LLOYD, supra note 8, at 97.
51 HOLLINOER, supra note 4, at 147.
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ideological attack from its own intelligensia as well as from radical leftists. These
critiques began in the 1950's, with a more or less theoretical debate over the
value of ideology, 2 and culminated in the alternative proposals of participatory, 3
juridical, 4 and the renewed classically liberal ideal of the state.5"
1. The End of Ideology Argument
In the 1950's a collateral attack on liberal ideology ensued. Growing partly
out of their frustration in failing to motivate the American working class, critics
charged that ideology in America is meaningless. This is so because the rigid
categories of conservative and liberal do not apply to the concrete realities of
social institutions, and because the conservative-liberal dichotomy is itself a series
of shared political principles." There is, in short, no difference in the con-
servative-liberal distinction.
The once unequivocal distinction between 'right' and 'left' had been dam-
aged by the knowledge that combinations once alleged by extremist doc-
trines to be impossible-combinations like . . . progressive social policies and
full employment under capitalization, large scale governmental controls with
public liberties-are actually possible.57
This confusion of ideologies is the result of the history of liberalism. Classic
liberalism became known as conservatism while a new liberalism grew out of
societal exigencies. 8
2. Participatory Democracy
A way had to be found, therefore, to construct a meaningful ideology which
would effectively motivate people to achieve serious ideological objectives, e.g.
a truly participatory democracy.5" This effort was the New Left of the 1960's.
It is doubtful, however, that the New Left ever became more than an uncoordi-
nated effort to achieve certain specific goals: an end to the Indo-Chinese incur-
sion and a commitment by national politicians to an end of racism."
3. Juridical Democracy
The failure of the New Left to offer a serious ideological alternative led
liberally-inclined persons to find their own. Theodore J. Lowi's The End of
52 Waxman, Introduction, in THE END OF IDEOLOGY DEBATE 3 (C. Waxman ed. 1968).
53 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement, in THE NEW STUDENT
LEFT 16 (M. Cohen & D. Hale eds. 1966).
54 T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISIM-IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY 297 (1969) [hereinafter cited as LowI].
55 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Daniels, Introduction, in READING RAWLS-
CRITICAL STUDIES OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE at xiii-xvi (N. Daniels ed. n.d.).
56 R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY O F LIBERALISM 3 (1968).
57 Shils, The End of Ideology?, in THE END OF IDEOLOGY DEBATE 52 (C. Waxman ed.
1968).
58 Id.
59 Students for a Democratic Society, supra note 53.
60 Waxman, supra note 52, at 5-6.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Liberalism61 attacks the expansion of governmental activities under new liberal-
ism. He calls for both a restoration of the Schecter"2 rule-requiring clear stan-
dards on which administrative quasi-judicial bodies must guide their decision-
making-and greater use of administrative rule-making.63
Lowi views new liberalism as entailing an unprincipled delegation of
discretionary power. Such a delegation of legislative power is inefficient and
undemocratic. Furthermore, the accompanying delegation of judicial power is
dangerous because courts decide primarily on the basis of well-established rules,
the doctrine of stare decisis, while administrative organs do not.64
No doubt many of the recommendations which Lowi propounds are valu-
able ideas. In fact, the courts now do impose sophisticated standards on adminis-
trative bodies;5 judicial oversight has also become more strict in recent years
due to a better appreciation within Congress of real excesses in administrative
discretionary power.66 Additionally, rule-making requirements are today rou-
tinely contained in social legislation. 7 However, Lowi's ideas do not present an
alternative to new liberalism, since a holistic ideology is not contained within his
work and the end of liberalism, which the book's title forecasts, is nowhere to be
found in society.
4. The Renewal of Classic Liberalism
What is presently occurring in society can best be described as a widespread
disillusionment with government regulation, coupled with a search for workable
values. Old values are being given new emphasis. The best example of this
search within the area of jurisprudence is John Rawls' A Theory of Justice."8
Rawls offers a vision of man in a virtual state of nature. His picture, a value-
laden hypothesis from which he derives the conditions of justice, constitutes a
reaffirmation of classic liberalism.
Most criticism of Rawls' conception of a state of nature-what he calls
the original position-focuses on its unreality. 9 Even as a scientific hypothesis
or a model from which applications of justice can be deduced, one wonders
whether any productive ideas for society will take shape. For the purposes of
this note, however the widespread notice given Rawls' effort indicates the interest
taken in preserving liberalism and suggests the need for a liberal philosophy that
does not suffer Rawls' theoretical difficulties.
VI. Toward a Restored Liberalism: The Philosophy and
Jurisprudence of Morris Raphael Cohen
Morris Raphael Cohen dedicated much of his philosophic and jurispru-
61 Lowi, supra note 54, at 125-56.
62 Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Lowi, id. at 126.
63 Lows, id. at 127, 299.
64 Id. at 299-300.
65 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
66 The Administrative Procedure Act is the primary effort. 5 U.S:C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
67 E.g. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1970).
68 RAWLS, supra note 55.
69 Daniels, supra note 55, at xviii-xxii.
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dential writings to the preservation of liberalism. The remainder of this essay
concentrates on how Cohen set about to accomplish that purpose, holding
together old and new liberalism, and how his theory answers the valid criticisms
of liberalism made by Lowi and others.
A. Amor Dei Intellectualis
Cohen's autobiographical writings,70 and his daughter's Portrait of a Phi-
losopher," recount the influences which worked on his mind. More than most
thinkers, Cohen's background and practical experience must be counted as the
inspiration for his vision and insight. Probably, it is this human element which
makes Cohen's thought so appealing. From his emigration as a Russian Jew
to his philosophic education at Harvard and throughout his long career of writing
and teaching, this human quality persisted."2
A strict religious background operated at the fountainhead of Cohen's
mature philosophy. Raised in the orthodox Jewish faith, he spent a relatively
large portion of his boyhood in study and prayer. Even after he threw off the
rituals of organized religion and rejected belief in an anthropomorphic deity,
Cohen continued to relish the Judaic idea of an intellectual love of God (Amor
Dei Intellectualis) .7 Traditionally, this concept rested on the divinity of truth.
As espoused by Spinoza, learning literally brings one closer to God because God
is everywhere in the world.
Cohen, however, accepted neither assumption. Conversant in philosophic
and scientific knowledge, he postulated a metaphysical concept of eternity which
lies beyond both space and time. Within the bounds of eternity there is con-
tinuous spatial and temporal flux, i.e. history, the concrete occurrences of physical
reality. But the existence of eternity beyond historical change allows for an ele-
ment of superior constancy relative to any change which does occur.
This vision of eternity over and above space and time may be compared to
a jigsaw puzzle. When we work a jigsaw puzzle, each additional piece brings us
closer to an understanding of the whole scene of the completed puzzle. The
whole scene, however, is qualitatively different than the individual pieces. So it
is with space and time and eternity. Only an increase of our knowledge con-
cerning the interaction of space and time will afford us a better grasp of the
whole scene, i.e. eternity. Yet eternity is qualitatively different than its com-
ponents, space and time.
An increase of knowledge of spatial-temporal relations, therefore, adds new
meaning to the nature of eternity. Herein lies the value of learning, especially
scientific learning: orderly or systematic acquisition of knowledge brings man
closer to an understanding of eternity.74
70 M. COHEN, A DREAMER'S JOURNEY (1949).
71 L. ROSENFIELD, PORTRAIT OF A PHILOSOPHER (1962).
72 Preface to HOLLINGER, supra note 4, at xii.
73 M. COHEN, The Intellectual Love of God, in THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 307 (1946).




The existence of eternity, Cohen thought, is not merely theologically com-
forting for those who can't find firm meaning in this ever-changing world. The
existence of eternity is logically necessary for scientific thought of any sort, in-
cluding legal science. Science, like philosophy, is a matter of building logically
consistent systems. This construction takes place in two ways-deductive or in-
ductive inference. Deductive inference begins with a generalized hypothesis and
logically derives theoretical results. Those theories are then tested against observ-
able phenomena. As previously indicated, classic liberals like Locke and Rawls
employed deductive reasoning. Inductive inference, on the other hand, proceeds
from observable occurrences to build generalized conclusions. The positivists
and new liberals typically utilized such an approach.
Neither deductive nor inductive methods would retain any meaning, how-
ever, if there were no overall system, i.e. eternity, within which to fit the knowl-
edge thereby obtained. A scientist who pursues knowledge, Cohen argued, im-
plicitly assumes that there must be some order out there. Otherwise, he would
not be learning anything from his investigations.7 5
C. Jurisprudence: The Science of Law
A judge or jurisprude similarly makes certain ethical assumptions when he
decides a case or formulates a theory of law. Otherwise, the sole purpose of law,
i.e. justice, would dwindle away and the legal order would become a meaningless
exercise of governmental power. Cohen thus criticized the positivist concept of
legal science as an inductive enterprise devoid of ethical content. On the other
hand, Holmes was entirely correct when he observed the social biases of many
judges. Rather than pursuing the positivist goal of trying to eliminate such prej-
udices-an impossible task which, even if it could be accomplished, would
render the law meaningless-Cohen believed that social biases should be con-
sciously articulated and controlled. Cohen thereby established himself as a critic
of legal positivism while at the same time he put himself in the corner of new
liberalism, especially sociological jurisprudence. For, like Pound, Cohen favored
improved social control through law.
However, Cohen's attack on positivism transcended sociological jurispru-
dence by its insistence on more than the mere categorization of social interests.
Such reordering of social priorities is necessary but is not, of itself, sufficient for
a complete legal science. More or less aligning himself with classic liberalism,
Cohen asserted that justice has an even more general ethical component. For
instance, the classic liberals, who authored the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution, assumed the truth of certain ethical prop-
ositions76 We can apply these documents properly only if we incorporate such
values into our legislative and judicial decision-making. The failure of judges to
present their own ethical values up front subverts the aims of legal science.
75 Id. at 311.
76 See note 7 supra.
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Whereas the value orientation of judges confuses the state of the law when it is
hidden, when acknowledged it enables the law to take a step closer to the status
of a logically complete system.
Cohen's legal science, then, may be viewed as an effort to give sociological
jurisprudence a natural law foundation. Like the classic liberal, he looked to
the establishment of general ethical rules from which legal decisions would be
deduced. But Cohen held on to the empirical dimension to inform law-makers
of the social realities involved in each particular case and in society at large.
Both morals and empirical observation are thus necessary components of the
ideal of a logically complete and consistent system of legal science.7
D. Law and Morals
At the same time, Cohen warned against the confusion of law and morals.
The "is" of positive law and the "ought" of morality both go into his concept
of legal science. Still, they are theoretically distinct:
While I regard this integrative task [i.e. the introduction of values into
our practical law-making] as necessary, it seems to me fatal to try to meet
it by disregarding clear distinctions and confusing the theory of law with
vague or questionable moral ideas and sentiments."
Cohen here distinguished his concept of natural law from that of the classic
liberals. Locke and many others had stipulated to the immutable goodness and
applicability of certain particular social structures relevant to all societies, e.g.
the sanctity of contract, property, etc. Cohen, however, hoped to unite natural
law with natural science. He realized that different institutions are well suited
for different geographical, ethnic, and racial units. Natural law has a changing
content and only the most general moral propositions remain constant. Con-
fusing our moral values with the condition of positive law too often means im-
posing our cultural biases on foreign societies. Cohen hoped to avoid this classic
liberal tendency by his call for a clear distinction between morals and the law.7 1
E. Liberalism and Legal Science
Cohen's notion of legal science, grounded in natural law principles, is
peculiarly tied to certain values commonly associated with liberalism. Liberal-
ism, for Cohen, consists of
a faith in enlightenment, a faith in a process rather than a set of doctrines,
a faith instilled with pride in the achievements of the human mind, and yet
colored with a deep humility before the vision of a world so much larger
than our human hopes and thoughts....
77 M. COHEN, Philosophy and Legal Science, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 245 (1933).





[L]iberalism means a pride in human achievement, a faith in human
effort .... The philosophy back of that is summed up in two great faiths
or beliefs: the belief in progress, and the belief in toleration .... [Tj]hose
are the two fundamental ideas of liberalism 80
The classic liberalism of John Locke is grounded on a certain partisan
political ideology, i.e. the inherent right of the people to revolt before tyranny.
No doubt Cohen also would have defended the natural right of revolution in
certain circumstances. But, unlike Locke, his primary aim was not a set of doc-
trines, e.g. the natural status of revolution. Rather, Cohen aimed for the more
generalized principles of progress and toleration. Such ideals, he concluded, are
logically necessary for free scientific inquiry. Conversely, rational inquiry unre-
strained by governmental or private intervention is the sine qua non of liberal
civilization.
Indeed, scientific inquiry, social progress, and toleration of differences are
interdependent manifestations of Cohen's liberalism. Critical scientific inquiry
thrives only within a tolerant environment in which differing ideas and opinions
are freely exchanged. Scientific discovery in turn yields progress.8 1 Progress is
never limited by Cohen, however, to material betterment. Nor, as some critics
charge, did Cohen's acceptance of social differences as the changing content of
a single set of natural law principles bring him dangerously close to complacent
acquiescence to the status quo."2 Man's mind, Cohen believed, is always capable
of improvement and cannot be reduced to material dependencies. Progress often
takes the form of increased self-understanding. What is is right for a particular
society in terms of its material organization though not formally right. Most
societies, in fact, only approximate complete adherence to the principles of
natural law. 3
Progress, therefore, is not inevitable. Legal change, for example, is a matter
of selecting certain rules from a host of other possibilities. Since the scientific
jurisprude investigates all logical possibilities, he creates an open developing
system in which the best rules are eventually uncovered. But a non-scientific
selection process is not very likely to turn up the most ethically sound rule. Thus
the likelihood of progress, as Cohen defined the term, hinges on the degree to
which scientific inquiry is freely tolerated and applied.84
Cohen's legal science and liberalism, consequently, rest on a well-premised
laissez faire of the mind. While restriction of the free thoughts of citizens is
detrimental to social progress, unrestricted freedom of thought practically guar-
antees it. The mind is self-corrective, guided by an invisible harmony, even if
society is not.
80 M. COHEN, The Future of American Liberalism, in THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 437, 449
(1946).
81 Id. at 450, 452.
82 HOLLINGER, supra note 4, at 178.
Further, was not the method by which the "science of natural law" would even-
tually discover such invariants i.e. ethical principles dangerously close to historicism?
If the ground of imperatives was the moral consensus of the race, would not one be
resolving "ought" questions 'by collecting historical facts? Id&
83 M. COHEN, Prologue: My Philosophy of Law, in REASON AND LAW 12 (1961).
84 The Future of American Liberalism, note 80 supra, at 452.
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F. Rule and Discretion
Furthermore, affirmation by Cohen of the possibility of legal science rests,
as previously stated, on his recognition that both deductive and inductive thought
processes are involved in judicial decision-making. Stated differently, the law
utilizes both rule and discretion 5
The aim of legal science, like all sciences, is the construction of general rules
from diverse facts. By these rules, new conclusions (judgments) can be deduced.
Nevertheless, we must recognize that the possibilities of factual variation are
endless. Hence no system of generalized rules will ever entirely supplant the
use of discretion.s
Thus Lowi's criticism of the excesses of administrative discretion would be
well taken by Cohen. Probably, however, Cohen would caution Lowi against
thinking that greater judicial oversight will eliminate the use of discretion.
Judicial decision-making always contains an element of discretion. Rather,
what needs to be done is to examine the nature of discretion and its interaction
with rules."7
G. Logic in the Law
1. Scientific Method
The susceptibility of law to scientific analysis implies that there is a logic
akin to liberalism underlying positive legal enactments. Cohen identified three
usages of the term 'logic': (1) "the tracing of the necessary implication and the
clarification of our statements,""8 (2) "the narrow hard-heartedness of those
who in the name of logic or consistency cling to some rule or maxim as a premise
without being willing to see its limitations.. .,," and (3) "certain aesthetic con-
siderations, intellectual symmetries, or elegantia juris .. ."" The second defini-
tion is symptomatic of the formalist type of thinking which Holmes and Dewey
had attacked. The third meaning is that used by the aesthete; sometimes, how-
ever, it is used by the lawyer, judge, or natural law philosopher when they claim
either an eternal harmony or a material analogy on which to base their reasoning.
From his reading of the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, a logical prag-
matist, Cohen adopted the first definition as that most geared to liberal cum
scientific pursuits. In a letter to Justice Holmes, Cohen wrote that his
agreement with pragmatism extends to the main point made by Peirce, viz.
that the way to make our ideas clear is to examine their possible con-
sequences, or in technical language, their possible implications. It is an
85 M. COHEN, Rule Versus Discretion, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 259 (1933).
86 Id. at 261.
87 Id. Such an examination is provided by the admirable work of Professor Davis on Dis-
cretionary Justice-A Preliminary Inquiry. Supra note 41. Critical analysis of Davis' work
lies beyond the scope of this topic and would consume a lengthy digression. It is significant to
note in this context, however, that Davis plainly relies on Cohen's description of legal change-
the historical oscillation from rule to discretion, from formalism to reform-as one source
of his own thoughts. Supra note 41, at 19.
88 Prologue: My Philosophy of Law, supra note 83, at 13.




attempt to extend the experimental method to the handling of ideas, and
very fruitful if used logically, for the very essence of intellectual liberality
consists in the realization that what is familiar to us is only one of a number
of possibilities. 9'
This exploration of all logical possibilities leaves room in the law for the
conscious and measured infusion of ethical values. Legal science is also thereby
saved from becoming merely a program of observation, description, and gener-
alization as the positivists wished. Nor does it stop at the inductive boundaries
drawn by the new liberal jurisprudes, i.e. sociological factors. Similarly, this
conception of scientific method is distinguished from the abstract deductions
made by the older school of natural law liberals.
Clearly, Cohen set his sights very high when he wrote about scientific meth-
od. The task is an impossible one; consideration of all logical possibilities is
virtually an endless effort even in a fairly simple factual situation. Cohen, in fact,
realized that only the introduction of evaluative guides will bring this exploratory
process to a close. The evaluative guides which Cohen thought helpful are
embodied in two concepts: the principle of polarity92 and the notion of con-
ceptual twilight zones.93
2. The Principle of Polarity
The principle of polarity relates to Cohen's observation that facts often
take shape in the minds of men in terms of two opposite, contradictory positions.
Aristotle's logical doctrine of contradiction is a generalized expression of this
tendency.94 Cohen's polarity principle applied not only to logical formulae but
also to the entire corporeal world. It is defined as "the principle that opposite
categories like identity and difference, rest and motion, individuality and uni-
versality, etc. must always be kept together though never identified."95 When
looking to see, for example, the extent to which ethics should be fitted into man-
made legal judgments, the principle of polarity reminds us that a judgment
devoid of ethical impact is impossible. Try as we may to achieve neutral prin-
ciples, values are necessarily a part of judicial decisions. By means of this prin-
ciple, then, we realize that progress in both legal science and other sciences, in-
cluding philosophy, "can be made not by simply trying to prove that one side
or the other is the truth, but by trying to get at the difficulty and determining
in what respect and to what extent each side is justified."96 The theorist is
thereby prevented from taking either a purely classic natural law position, e.g.
"Justice is law" or a positivist position, e.g. "Law has nothing to do with justice."
3. Twilight Zones
Sometimes, however, the polarities are not precisely opposing. In a complex
91 ROSENFIELD, supra note 71, at 326.
92 Preface to M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE at xi, 165.
93 Cohen, Concepts and Twilight Zones, 24 J. PHIL. 673 (1927).
94 A thing cannot be and not be at the same time.




issue it is not always easy to tell where one polarity ends and the other begins.
An example of this is seen in the courts' struggle to separate that which is obscene
from that which is not obscene, to determine when life begins and when it ends,
and to fix the limits of just punishment as opposed to cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The dividing lines between these polarities are obviously unclear. Acknowl-
edging these complexities, Cohen asserted the existence of twilight zones: "From
the point of view of the principle of polarity, twilight zones are regions about
the point of equilibrium of opposite tendencies. 97
The admission by Cohen of unclarity in our practical judgments and scien-
tific theories won him the criticism of philosophers but the appreciation of scien-
tists and lawyers. The philosophers thought that unclarity of any sort is not very
helpful, and they wanted to know precisely how opposite categories interact.
Those who actually worked with these concepts in a practical sense, on the other
hand, appreciated Cohen's honesty and insight. Justice Cardozo was gratified,
for example, to
have won a forceful auxiliary in the philosophy of Prof. Cohen with its
insistence upon twilight zones in the world of nature and of ideas, and upon
the principle of polarity as the mediating force between them.9 8
For Cardozo, like Cohen, felt that
the judicial process is one of compromise, a compromise between paradoxes,
between certainty and uncertainty, between the literalism that is the exal-
tation of the written word and the nihilism that is destructive of regularity
and order.99
H. The Challenge of Liberalism and Legal Science
The inherent normative content and scientific structure of the legal system
led Cohen to challenge certain practices and dogmas of American law. He was
among the first to attack the phonograph theory of judicial decision-making-
the notion that judges find and do not make the law.' 9 An unconscious or
hidden establishment of new legal rules under the guise of stare decisis, legal
fictions, or vague concepts like reasonableness, betrays the science of law. Agree-
ing with Holmes, Cohen similarly noted that use of the fourteenth amendment's
due process and equal protection clauses often conceals deep-seated economic
and ethical motives.'
97 Concepts and Twilight Zones, note 93 supra, at 679.
98 B. CARDozo, Jurisprudence (Address before the New York State Bar Association Meet-
ing, Jan. 22, 1932), in S LECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 25 '(M. Hall ed.
1947).
99 Id.
100 M. COHEN, The Process of judicial Legislation, in LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 113
(1933). According to the "the phonograph theory of the judicial function . . . the judge
merely repeats the words that the law has spoken into him .. " Id.
101 Id. at 135. A recent law review article endorses the conscious application of ethical
values to constitutional issues much as did Cohen. The author, like Cohen, believes that the
best way to control discretion is to stipulate precisely what ethical problems are inherent to
due pirocess of law questions. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Ad-
ministrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Legal science and liberalism also undergirded Cohen's critique of American
legal education. He disparaged legal education for its failure to develop legal
scientists. Knowledge of the general principles and social orientation of positive
law should take priority over the study of minute details and the acquisition of
mechanical skills. Even from a practical standpoint, the former would prove
more beneficial in the long run. A legal scientist knows the contrasting values in
a particular situation and makes intelligent decisions by weighing those values." 2
The mechanical jurisprude, on the other hand, adjudges facts solely on grounds
of expediency and personal bias.
Throughout his work, Cohen repeatedly aimed toward placing liberal values
and the law on a scientific foundation. Success meant the restoration of intellec-
tual integrity to both. Ultimately, it meant the realization of greater tolerance,
social progress, and a more ethically secure system of law. In the present days
of challenge to accepted values and the law, a renewal of Cohen's liberalism
and legal science is in order.
VII. Conclusion
The history of liberalism in the United States took a new direction at the
end of the nineteenth century. Previous exponents of liberal doctrine asserted
the existence of immutable values and social harmonies from which particular
applications of justice could be deduced. Industrialism, the growth of mass
society, and a new intellectual temper set by Charles Darwin prompted a liberal
reaction. This new liberalism constituted a revolt against the formalism of classic
liberalism. Sociological and realist schools grew up as efforts to explain society
and the law on a nonmetaphysical, empirical basis. Subsequent disappointment
with new liberalism engendered severe philosophical and political critiques of it.
However, no serious ideological alternative was offered. As a result, some
thinkers have turned back to classic liberal concepts. Others are still searching
for a philosophical framework within which to place their typically liberal values.
Morris Raphael Cohen attempted to provide such a framework. Concerned
with the renewal of an intellectually respectable liberalism, Cohen sought to lay
a scientific foundation for it. His notion of legal science urges the admission of
general ethical precepts to a scientific analysis of society. Judges should thus
articulate both the sociological interests and the ethical pre-dispositions which
guide their decision-making. In tying together law, science, and morality, Cohen
believed that the key values of liberalism-social progress and toleration of
personal differences-could be preserved. Considering the current disillusion-
ment with the values of liberalism, Cohen's social philosophy and jurisprudence
merit reconsideration.
Edward B. Myers
102 ROSr.NFIELD, supra note 71, at 195, 240-42, 297-300.
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